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Abstract 
Current European railway standards highlight the influence of human 
factors into railway system’s safety. In spite of this precept the integration is 
less frequent in engineering practice. The paper proposes the consideration 
of human factors in several life-cycle phases and in different risk 
perspectives in railway design and operation. Even for the classic method of 
integrating human error in quantitative risk analysis, the study for railway 
applications shows that data for error probabilities and existing techniques 
involve significant drawbacks. A straight-forward model of working systems is 
developed to structure influence factors on human performance and to 
provide a practicable cause-and-effects diagram. Additionally, current safety 
mechanisms in railways should be studied concerning their efficiency in 
terms of human-barrier-interaction. By providing this technique and basis for 
further development, the paper contributes to the integration of human 
performance into safety assessments and railway engineering practice.  
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1. Introduction 
In continental Europe, the consideration of human factors does not have a long 
tradition. Although a high percentage of accidents are accounted to human error, the 
integration of human contribution into the system’s safety is often rudimentarily 
analyzed in railway engineering. Unfortunately, outdated approaches of continuous 
automation or usage of fixed human error probabilities for quantitative risk analyses 
can still be found. Therefore, this article takes a point of view quite close to railway 
engineering practice and tries to give some answers on the need for human factors 
integration. 
 
2. Current situation for human factors and railway system safety 
2.1 Human factors in the railway system’s life-cycle 
The focus of this paper is set to dependability understood as reliability, availability 
and maintainability and particularly safety (RAMS). The most important and well-
known standard for the system design of railway technical components EN 50126-1 
(CENELEC, 1999; section 4.4.2) requires integration of human factors. In spite of 
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emphasizing the importance of consideration of human factors of railway system’s 
staff, the standard provides sparse information on the way of integration. 
The principal model of RAMS that can be found in the standard was retrofitted by 
Anders (2004). Figure 1 shows that human factors particularly appear in the design 
and construction, operation and maintenance phases. Note that in our contribution the 
strict division of correct and incorrect human actions from Anders (2004) is 
abandoned. It is important to mention that systematic (human) failures in the design 
phase appear in the set of internal disturbances in the operational period. 
 
 
Figure 1: Human factors in the railway system safety life-cycle (adopted from Anders, 2004) 
 
The workplace of humans at the sharp end, i.e. the railway system in operation, 
and corresponding safety-related risks is shaped by design engineers, the employer 
and the operator himself. Hereby, the designer is not necessarily only located at the 
manufacturer as the operating company (i.e. the employer) often sets up the 
requirements very closely, in the railway industry.  
If safety assessments consider human factors, the scope is frequently limited to 
the designer’s evaluation of the risk that evolves from the operator’s task (see 
table 1). Thereby firstly, the designer neither estimates divergences to the user’s risk 
perception in the moment of operation nor takes his own error into account. Though, 
systematic errors are to be controlled by requirements determined by safety integrity 
levels and new safety management systems. The design engineer has an external 
and stable perspective to evaluate risk for a human-machine-system, though the 
operator has a very flexible point of view for his risk control (Vanderhaegen, 2004). 
Secondly, the employer and his risk assessment and safety-related measures are cut 
out of these considerations. We argue that future risk assessments have to integrate 
not only the human factors of the operator, but also the employer’s measures and the 
risk of human error in the design phase.  
 
Risk 
evaluation 
 Workplace under consideration 
Party performing the task 
  Designer Employer Operator 
Designer Limited Limited Most common 
Employer Only indirect Limited Common 
Party 
conceiving 
the risk Operator Only indirect Only indirect Limited 
Table 1: Risk perception by designer, employer and operator for the different parties 
 
In the remainder of this paper, we focus on the design for human operators in the 
operation and maintenance phase due to the long duration and the comparatively 
high risks this phase involves. In addition, we limit the scope to train drivers – 
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meaning staff of the railway operating company, undertaking the task of driving trains 
– and signallers – meaning staff of the infrastructure managing company undertaking 
the task of authorizing the movement of trains (definitions taken from the Technical 
Specifications for Interoperability). These two work stations influence railway 
performance and safety directly and on-line in the moment of operation. 
 
2.3 Quantitative risk analysis 
The European standard EN 50129 (CENELEC, 2003) requires a quantitative risk 
analysis for safety-related railway systems. Hazards are to be identified and the 
corresponding risk is estimated. If the risk is not negligible, it has to be proven that the 
final product fulfils the safety requirements. The actual hazard rate of a safety-related 
function must not be higher than the associated tolerable hazard rate. The reliability of 
functions implemented by technical components can in most cases be estimated 
sufficiently. The human reliability is usually characterized by an estimation of a human 
error probability. Bringing together technical reliability and human performance is vital 
for railway transport because most safety-related functions are implemented by a 
combination of technical systems and human actions. 
 
2.4 Résumé and proposals 
The safety assessment and approval processes still vary in many European 
countries. During the harmonization (see e.g. Cassir, 2008), there is the chance to 
integrate human contribution to system safety and performance, in order to not only 
establish technical but also human interoperability. 
The most important standard for railway dependability engineering proposes the 
integration of human factors without providing approaches. Anyhow, EN 50126-1 
recommends the use of cause-and-effect-diagrams for the consideration of human 
factors. In order to fulfil this need, we propose a model for work systems later in this 
paper. This approach may serve as a basis to address human influence factors for the 
railway engineering practitioner. Besides, we stress that the scope of human factors 
considerations should exceed engineering for the operator’s workplace. 
Quantitative risk analyses are required by EN 50129. So, an often-used, but not 
sufficient way to assess human contribution to dependability is to integrate human 
error in classic risk analysis techniques. By using this approach, there is a risk to 
degrade the human operator to a simple brick in the wall, error-prone and 
undesirable. However, the broad acknowledgement of the standards in the railway 
sector creates a significant need in practice to bring together human and technical 
performances in a quantitative way. Some of the classic ways of human reliability 
assessment and their drawbacks are discussed in the following section. 
 
3. Discussion of existing approaches 
3.1 Human error in quantitative risk analysis 
When pursuing a classic risk assessment, the railway practitioner has difficulties 
in integrating the human reliability into the analysis methods: this is due to the lack of 
valid data for human error probabilities in the railway domain.  
In German railway engineering practice, sometimes the constant human error 
probability of 10-3 is chosen in spite of the high variability of human performance. 
More sophisticated risk analyses refer to the values for human error in railway 
transport published by Hinzen (1993). 18 fixed probabilities are presented in 
dependence of stress level, surrounding conditions and Rasmussen’s three levels of 
behaviour: knowledge-based, rule-based and skill-based (Rasmussen, 1983). 
Feldmann et al. (2008) show that neither Hinzen’s values are fully proven to be valid 
for the railway transport, nor do accident statistics provide comprehensive data to 
derive human error probabilities. In order to obtain probabilities for certain working 
conditions, the classic approach is to use human reliability assessment (HRA) 
methods. 
 4
 
3.2 Existing techniques for human reliability assessment 
The steps of the most HRA approaches are to perform a qualitative analysis of the 
task by conducting a task analysis together with an assessment of possible human 
errors. Subsequently, human error quantification (HEQ) methods can be applied. 
The technique Analysis of Consequences of Human Unreliability (ACIH) 
(Vanderhaegen, 2001) represents a non-probabilistic technique for human reliability 
assessment. The non-quantitative method can be used when a qualitative integration 
of human error into risk assessment is sufficient. One of the most common HEQ 
methods is called THERP (Technique of Human Error Rate Prediction) (Swain & 
Guttmann, 1983). First, the task under consideration is decomposed into several 
individual tasks. The corresponding nominal probability from the handbook is to be 
adjusted by a set of so called performance shaping factors (PSF) and the calculation 
by prescribed rules. The nominal probabilities in THERP were recorded in the nuclear 
power industry. Not only does railway transport differ from that application, also the 
values reflect a technology and control system design that is actually no more 
applicable. THERP was already initially applied to the railway driving task (Chaali-
Djelassi et al. 2007), but without the adaptation of the probabilities by influencing 
factors. Another technique, HEART (Human Error Assessment and Reduction 
Technique) (Williams, 1986) is also based on nominal probabilities that are adjusted 
by so called error producing conditions. Also, to adapt this technique to railway work 
places is challenging and possibly exposed to discussions due to the original 
estimations of the probabilities with different workplaces in mind. 
Some of the latter drawbacks of existing techniques were motivation for the British 
rail safety and standards board to develop a first railway-specific HRA method (RSSB, 
2005). A review exposed the high complexity and some disadvantages of the new 
technique (Hickling, 2007). Analyzing the 29 factors that influence the human 
performance, a high degree of overlapping and interdependence between the PSF 
can be observed. Consider for example the set of factors unfamiliarity, driver 
experience and technique learning. In rail-HEQ – like in several HRA methods – 
performance shaping factors represent a complex set and are neither well-separated 
nor visualized. PSF like concentration and fatigue can themselves be influenced by 
other factors before. Here, we propose a clarification, i.e. a differentiation between 
cause and effects, in order to avoid faulty double-representation of influence factors. 
At least since the human error taxonomy by Reason (1990) it has been known that 
human malfunctions appear in several shapes. Some classic risk analysis techniques 
are capable of modelling errors of omission (leaving out an action) and errors of 
commission (performing an action in a wrong manner); i.e. slips or lapses. The 
following three types make human error even more difficult to predict and are not yet 
fully covered by analysis techniques: intentional human errors, known as violations 
(though see Polet et al., 2002), unexpected human actions not necessary from a 
system point of view and finally human recovery of errors. 
 
3.3 Human variability and resilience 
The drawbacks of existing approaches and the great variability of human error 
have led to new ideas to bring human factors and safety together. Understanding 
human variability as a capability and not as a threat, understanding safety as the 
presence of adaptability instead of the absence of weaknesses or human errors has 
become known as resilience engineering (Hollnagel et al., 2006). See Quéva (2008) 
for an approach of adaptability and reactivity to describe human variability when 
driving an urban train. The accident analysis method FRAM developed by Hollnagel 
(2004) has also been applied to the railway domain (Belmonte, 2009). Needless to 
say that – due to their distance to the classical analysis of human error – these 
publications do not exactly respond to the need of the CENELEC railway standards. 
 
 5
3.4 Discussion and approach 
Summing up the considerations of the last three subsections, neither fixed values 
for human error probabilities nor one of the existing HRA techniques can fully meet 
the requirements of the standards. There is a demand for the development of a 
serviceable tool applicable in railway engineering practice. The method’s components 
have to be less fine-grained to stay practicable and however should provide at least 
semi-quantitative assessments of human error and performance. Without limiting the 
scope to non-intentional errors, the paper proposes a clarification and railway 
applicable structuring of performance shaping factors with a work system model. 
 
4. Structure for performance shaping factors 
4.1 Introduction to the work system model  
In this section, we propose a somewhat simplified structure for performance 
shaping factors, applicable to the railway system. The approach is based on a model 
on working environments in Hammerl et al. (2008). The structure is secondly brought 
forward to provide a cause and effects diagram that is required by EN 50126-1. The 
model attempts to visualise engineering and psychologists perspectives in a 
straightforward manner. Human factors influences and phenomena in a working 
system are separated into set variables the railway engineer can modify and rather 
dependent variables, i.e. the behaviour of the human in certain surroundings. 
 
 
Figure 2: Model of working systems and performing shaping factors 
 
The model of working systems defines the work system core as an interaction of a 
human, his task, and his instruments (see the center of figure 2). The set variables 
are represented by physical, personal and organizational factors, i.e. performance 
shaping factors. It is clear that some of the organizational measures have an impact 
on personal factors, see the small arrow at the bottom of figure 2. For example, the 
training has an influence on the employee’s skills. All the influencing factors at the top 
and the bottom have a continuous influence on the work system core and are less 
dynamic, i.e. at least constant for a shift. In contrary, the horizontal axis represents 
the work system in the moment of operation: inputs of information change 
dynamically. Via the work system core, influencing factors as well as input factors 
have an impact on the work result (output; e.g. controlling the movement of the train). 
A zoom on the human reaction in these surroundings was added to the core of the 
work system in order to take the high mental part of the train driver’s and the 
signaller’s work into account. Consider figure 3 as a new center in figure 2. 
Phenomena like workload, stress and vigilance shall here – with a certain 
simplification – be understood as passive, i.e. dependent variables, and as subjective 
human reaction on the influencing factors. For example, vigilance (in the center) 
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depends on the tiredness (personal factor), the roster planning (organizational factor), 
and in a way on the design of the human-machine-interaction as well – think of the 
dead-man’s device for train drivers. Rather the influence factors offer the chance for 
modifications by redesign. So, a change of the independent variables (causes) results 
in effects in the human-machine-system. 
 
 
Figure 3: Layer of cognitive reactions 
 
4.2 Performance shaping factors 
Table 2 represents a detailing of the model. The items were derived and 
restructured on the basis of the performance shaping factors in THERP and rail-HEQ. 
For the application on railway working environments, a certain set of factors of 
THERP was not relevant; some factors of rail-HEQ have been revised. The table 
provides a straightforward structure that a railway engineering practitioner can apply 
and complement to the working situation under consideration. 
 
Physical factors 
Anthropometry Working conditions Design of HMI 
• Basic layout of the 
working environment 
• Physical conditions  
as temperature, 
humidity, light, noise 
• Positioning and layout of HMI
• Usability 
• Quality of feedback 
 
Personal factors  Organizational factors 
Individual 
factors 
Dependent factors  Employee related 
factors 
Standard factors 
• Health 
• Emotional 
tension 
• Age, 
Gender 
 
• Tiredness 
• Skills (rule, track and 
vehicle knowledge) 
• Experience 
• Motivation 
• Safety awareness 
 • Roster planning
• Leadership 
• Education 
• Training 
• Social aspects 
• Safety culture 
• Standards 
• Rules and 
guidelines 
• Task design 
Table 2: Performance shaping factors 
 
The inputs (figure 2) are changing dynamically and can therefore not be 
understood as performance shaping factors. For the train driver, inputs are 
information gathered by track observation, signal aspects, transmitted by cab 
instruments or radio communication. Weather conditions and the local state of the 
track vary too frequently for being included in an assessment of human performance. 
Delay and degraded modes cannot be directly visualized in the model due to its 
general approach. The task related factors from other techniques were included in the 
task design as an organizational factor. Task complexity, frequency, criticality and the 
corresponding time frame represent important affiliated performance shaping factors. 
 
4.3 Influences on human performance 
The influence of factors from the outside on human performance can be visualized 
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in chains of actions (see figure 4 for some examples). In line with table 2, personal 
factors (boxes without hatching on the left hand side) can be with or without influence 
by organizational factors. Note that PSF are constant for one work period while the 
cognitive reaction changes with the situation and corresponding inputs. Consider 
safety culture as an organizational factor, safety awareness as the permanent attitude 
of the operator and risk awareness as situation dependent consciousness. High 
subjective workload, less vigilance, incomplete situation awareness and reduced risk 
awareness are examples for error favouring conditions. So, the diagram offers a 
practicable tool to qualitatively illustrate influences on performance (causes and 
effects) of a human-machine-system situated in railway operation as is proposed by 
EN 50126-1. 
 
 
Figure 4: Examples for influence chains on human performance 
 
A following weighting of connections represents first the assessment of the degree 
of influence of particular performance shaping factors and second the appearance 
and severity of error favouring conditions. The semi-quantitative assessment should 
be undertaken either by both railway and human factors expert judgement or with the 
support of simulations and human factors studies in corresponding environments. The 
domain-specific analysis facilitates quantification useable for railway engineering 
practice; by intermediate-term research being made suitable for EN 50129. 
 
5 Human-barrier-interaction in railway systems 
In the preceding section, the influences on the human, on so-called cognitive 
reaction, were analyzed. In order to study organizational and physical influence 
factors in a better way and to take consequences of human performance into account, 
the utilisation of safety barriers is proposed as a another approach to human error. 
Barriers represent safety mechanisms that are installed to prevent undesired 
events from taking place or to protect against its consequences. The most common 
taxonomy of barriers distinguishes between material barriers being physically in the 
system, functional barriers creating dependencies, symbolic and immaterial barriers, 
the latter both being for example signs or rules (Hollnagel, 2004). For the 
classification of safety barriers in terms of a process model, a three step structure was 
proposed: barriers of prevention that prevent an undesired initial event from taking 
place, barriers of correction that recover the situation and barriers of containment that 
lessen the severity of the consequences. See Sklet (2006) for a deeper study. 
While a physical and a functional barrier system executes the barrier function 
itself, symbolic and immaterial barriers request an action and its performance 
represents the barrier function. Due to the dependency on human actions, these 
barrier systems can generally be estimated as being medium or less efficient 
(Hollnagel, 2008). 
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The efficiency of barriers in terms of human-barrier-interaction should be analyzed 
in a more profound manner. Thereby, the approach should not be limited to 
violations – interpreted as barrier removal in Polet et al. (2002) and Chaali-Djelassi et 
al. (2007) – but to human performance in general. The following barrier properties are 
proposed as exemplary detail criteria for a well-functioning of human-barrier-
interaction: ability, benefit and ease to deactivate; temporal presence (continuous or 
on-demand functioning), perceptibility of the barrier and its status and finally temporal 
and spatial distance between barrier system and barrier function. 
In order to apply this idea to the railway system, there is a necessity for barrier 
identification. Up to now, two initial approaches can be found in literature (Schwartz 
and Pelz, 2008; Radbo et al., 2008). Consider the protection against overspeed in the 
train-driving task as an example. A symbolic barrier of prevention is the speed 
indicator which is continuously visible to the driver. The high perceptibility certainly 
has a positive effect on the probability of well-functioning of this particular human-
barrier-system. In contrary, an advance speed limit sign appears only punctually and 
involves a certain delay to execution of the barrier function. The train control system 
(preventing overspeed in a technical way) is a functional barrier of correction that can 
be deactivated under circumstances and whose state is disadvantageously not 
always well perceivable for the operator. 
Regard the link to performance shaping factors: while the design of the speed 
indicator instrument is a physical factor (design of human-machine-interface), the 
actual information represents a dynamically changing input. Rules against overspeed 
constitute immaterial barriers of prevention and are organizational factors. 
So, the approach of human-barrier-interaction supports the analysis of 
performance shaping factors and their influence degree. Furthermore, barriers also 
permit the study of consequences of malfunctioning as barriers can overlap or secure 
each other. Last, the analysis of barrier regimes also gives hints for redesign and 
error reduction.  
 
6 Conclusion and outlook 
The paper pointed out the need for human factors integration in several phases of 
the railway system’s life cycle, supported by European standards. The actual limit of 
only considering the human performance of the operator must be overcome. The 
harmonization processes in European railway transport offer a possibility to open 
RAMS considerations for human factors. 
Unfavourably the strict requirement of quantitative risk analysis narrows down the 
perspective to the calculation of human unreliability. The drawbacks of this approach, 
related to railway transport have been described. 
This paper has presented a straight-forward model of working system to structure 
performing shaping factors. The approach practicably gives an overview on human 
factors for the railway engineer dealing with EN 50126-1. The assessment of 
efficiency of barriers in terms of human-barrier-interaction has been brought forward. 
These contributions and on-going research will support the future railway-specific and 
at least semi-quantitative substantiation and further analysis of the influencing factors. 
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